Design · Visa Vulnerability Agentic Harness (VVAH)

Data-Flow Diagram (DFD)

↩ architecture.html · generated 2026-08-14

Data Flow (DFD)

This document traces what data moves through Visa Vulnerability Agentic Harness (VVAH), at three levels of zoom. The labelled artifact on each arrow is the most useful thing to memorise as a newcomer.

Rendered images: 03_context_dfd.svg (L0), 02_dataflow_pipeline.svg (L1), 06_remediate_validate.svg (S10/S11).

Data enters as code plus context. It is progressively refined: raw code becomes a map, the map becomes a threat model, the threat model becomes a to-do list, the to-do list becomes findings, findings become verified findings, verified findings become a ranked report — and finally fixes and verdicts. Nothing skips ahead; each stage consumes the previous stage's artifact.

Level 0 — Context diagram

flowchart LR OP([Security Operator]) -->|scan/remediate/validate + config| VVAH[VVAH] TGT[(Target codebase)] -->|source, CVE, controls, CMDB| VVAH VVAH -->|prompt data egress| PROV([Model Provider]) PROV -->|model reasoning| VVAH VVAH -->|findings, SARIF, fixes, verdicts| ART[[Artifacts]] VVAH -. fixes: S10 fix mode .-> TGT ART -->|review| OP

External entities: the operator, the target codebase, and the model provider (data egress happens here). Note the dashed arrow back to the target — in fix mode VVAH writes to the code under scan.

Level 1 — Detection pipeline (S0 → S9)

flowchart LR R[(repo + CVE/controls/cmdb)] -->|source/sink seed| S0[S0 Seed] S0 -->|callgraph seed| S1[S1 Preprocess] S1 -->|ContextPackage| S2[S2 ThreatModel] S2 -->|ThreatModel| S3[S3 Decompose] S3 -->|TaskManifest chunks| S4[S4 DeepDive] S4 -->|"Finding[] + vote"| S5[S5 Prefilter] S5 -->|"gated Finding[]"| S6[S6 Verify] S6 -->|TRUE/FP + CVSS| S7[S7 Dedup] S7 -->|"canonical Finding[]"| S8[S8 Chain] S8 -->|FinalReport md| S9[S9 SARIF] S9 -->|parse md → SARIF| OUT[[report.md + report.sarif]]

Data stores touched: the SQLite state DB (per-stage checkpoints; S0–S4 individual, S5–S7 share the S7 checkpoint, S8/S9 separate) and the call-graph store (written by S1, read by S3 and S5–S8).

Artifact reference

Artifact Produced by Consumed by Shape
SeedPackage S0 S1, S3, S6 source→sink paths, taint facts
ContextPackage S1 S2, S3, S6 repo map + call graph
ThreatModel S2 S3, S6 assets, trust boundaries, ranked threats
TaskManifest (chunks) S3 S4 prioritised analysis units
Finding[] S4 S5 candidate vulns + evidence
gated Finding[] S5 S6 confidence/evidence-filtered
verified findings + CVSS S6 S7 TRUE/FALSE_POSITIVE + severity
canonical Finding[] S7 S8 deduplicated
FinalReport S8 S9, S10 ranked findings + chains (Markdown)
report.sarif S9 tooling SARIF 2.1.0

Level 2 — Remediation (S10) & Validation (S11)

flowchart LR F[(verified findings<br/>security-scan/)] --> SEL[Select top-N by CVSS] SEL --> REM[S10 Remediation Agent<br/>playbook → minimal fix] REM --> GATE[Policy gate<br/>deny/allow · forbidden paths · kill-switch] GATE -->|revert forbidden| REM GATE --> DTO[(DTO per finding<br/>remediate_report.json + diff)] DTO --> DISC[S11 discover<br/>no model spend] DISC --> PANEL[S11 Adversarial Panel<br/>security-architect + penetration-tester<br/>+ cross-repo-analyzer] PANEL --> SYN[Host gate synthesis<br/>conservative majority] SYN --> VERD[(Verdict<br/>validated / validation_failed / needs_review)]

Validation staging: S11 stages a pre-patched copy of the repo, confirms the remediation was actually applied, runs the read-only panel, synthesises gate consensus (host-side under deepagents; in-session under cli/sdk), re-scores deterministically, and writes the verdict back into the DTO's validation block. If consensus can't be persisted it fails closed to needs_review.

Cross-cutting data handling